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Abstract
Since the enactment of South Africa's Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Law in
September 1997, there is a growing debate around the role and function of EIAs. South
Africa now requires EIAs for major projects. In the cases where informal or ad hoc EIAs
were conducted, they were the result of public pressure or the government invoked a section
of the Environmental Conservation Act that effectively required an EIA. This paper argues
that while in some cases voluntary EIAs have played a significant role in avoiding and/or
mitigating environmental impacts, mandatory EIAs should be even better for South Africa,
if used properly. This paper acknowledges the constraints and limitations of EIAs and
deliberatly uses "successful" cases to identify aspects of the process that have worked well.
I use three case studies and interviews to show how EIAs have worked in South Africa and
how, despite specific decisions on projects, EIAs had broader effects on project plans. EIAs
are often judged by the result of the final decision. This study examines how EIAs affect
project plans and designs before final decisions are made. In cases where EIAs were
conducted at an early stage of a proposed development, the EIA process guided the final
outcome by avoiding or mitigating negative environmental impacts. Evidence from the
interviews and case studies supports the view that EIAs positively changed various project
plans.
For the purposes of this study, I measure effectiveness by showing that EIAs changed
project plans in ways that minimized environmental impacts. Additionally, I cite examples
of developments where EIAs were not required and disastrous outcomes followed. This
does not mean that an EIA would have avoided these impacts, but it would have revealed
some of the likely problems and probably saved time and money.
The three case studies involved EIAs which followed South Africa's Integrated
Environmental Management (IEM) guidelines. IEM is designed to ensure that
environmental consequences of development proposals are understood and adequately
considered in the planning process. The positive contributions of these EIAs highlight the
importance of ELAs and, if used properly, their role in improving environmental and
development decisions.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Lawrence E. Susskind
Title: Ford Professor of Urban and Environmental Planning
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I. Introduction
"The need to incorporate environmental considerations into the development
process is now a generally accepted principle in all developing countries and
most of them have either a formal EIA system or are still in an experimental
stage with the irregular preparation of EISs. The question is no longer
whether the principle is valid and applicable, but rather how it can be
operationally incorporated in the planning and management process"
(D. Devuyst, Environmental Management Vol. 3, 1993, p15 1).
International experience with environmental impact assessments (EIAs) has consistently
shown that while EIAs, in theory, are conducted to avoid and/or mitigate negative
environmental impacts, they are often used as rubberstamping mechanisms to justify project
plans that are ready to be implemented (ain et al, 1993, p17 9). Most EIAs happen as an
afterthought and make no difference to the project outcome. Developers' interests often
dominate environmental concerns. In countries with EIA experience, the political and
economic influences of developers have almost always outweighed the impact of an EIA.
Usually, political and economic interests influence the EIA and even where this may not be
the case, EIAs rarely influence the final project decisions. Years of practice and experience
have shown that EIAs are not purely technical acts, but rather political acts.1
When I began my study, I had no reason to believe that either voluntary or mandatory EIAs
would be effective in South Africa. As I researched the topic further, many of my skeptical
pre-conceptions were confirmed. However, as I began to ask a series of detailed questions, I
discovered a few cases that forced me to re-examine my earlier views. I came across
anecdotes and situations where EIAs had made positive changes to project plans and thus
avoided potential negative environmental impacts. I was intrigued by these cases and
decided to pursue this avenue in order to learn from them. I decided to focus this study on
these cases because I think that they can highlight some of the processes that work. This
study analyzes how EIAs affected project plans in three case studies, and draws out lessons
learned to improve future practice.
1 See Turnbull, R. (ed.), Environmental and Health Impact Assessment of Development Projects: A Handbook
for Practitioners, World Health Organization and Centre for Environmental Management and Planning,
London, 1992, and Susskind, L., "Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem", Vermont Lax
Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 1981.
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Skeptics of the EIA process can argue that this study only looks at cases that work and
ignores the countless other ELAs that made no difference to any decisions. Also, can we
really learn from a few cases that may be exceptions to the norm? Let me be the first to
acknowledge that this study does emphasize the "success" cases precisely because they are
the exceptions. What made these cases the exceptions and how did decisions change?
There are two ways to approach a study of this nature. One is to look at cases that did not
work and analyze their failures. The other is a study of this sort that examines the
"successes" and attempts to extract the positive lessons learned. South Africa is in an era
where we have some idea of what we do not want. As the country moves forward with a
new EIA law and regulations, perhaps we would like to focus on what we do want. This
study thus makes an attempt to convince the skeptics that the EIAs can work, if done
properly, and uses the few positive cases to make recommendations for future practice.
Twenty-two interviews were conducted with South Africans with a direct interest in the EIA
process, many of whom get paid for conducting EIAs. A critical reader may be curious
about the bias of this interviewee group, as most of them are more likely to be in favour of
EIAs because of their experience and interests. There are two reasons why I chose to
interview individuals: (1) they are most likely to point me to and comment on the "success"
cases; (2) they are probably most familiar with the overall process and can provide informed
commentary on the specific project plans that changed during the EIA process. In terms of
interview methodology, I often asked practitioners to comment on EIAs that they were not
personally involved in but had followed closely. For example, all the people 1 interviewed
commented on the Saldanha Steel Project EIA. In general, I found that the interviewees
were forthcoming and candid about their experiences. Without exception, the interviews
ended with a critical evaluation of the process and how it can be improved.
I would further like to acknowledge that this study does not purport to showcase EIA as the
solution to all of our environmental problems. Environmental impact assessments exist in a
context with other interests and constraints. A good EIA law and process will not solve the
problems around decision-making. Neither does it mean that developers will propose the
most environmentally sound projects or implement them. However, EIAs are currently
legislated and do play a role (the extent of their influence can be debated and is often tough
to determine) in the overall environmental and development decision-making process.
Because of this, then we need to realize the potential of this process and make it as efficient
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and effective as possible -- understanding the constraints and limitations both within and
without the process.
Rationale for Study
South Africa has fifteen years of experience with voluntary EIAs. In September 1997, a new
EIA law was passed, making ELAs mandatory for selected projects. There is much to learn
from the past practice of voluntary EIAs for the implementation of the new law and
regulations. This study examines the voluntary/informal mode of conducting ELAs in South
Africa and their impact on project plans and final development decisions. This research is
particularly timely given the recent enactment of the EIA law. Using interviews and three
case studies, this paper argues that the formalization of EIAs is a step in the right direction.
This study draws on lessons learned from such informal efforts to argue that mandatory
EIAs can benefit South Africa in important ways. I have collated and analyzed a series of
opinions from twenty-two interviews conducted in February and March 1998 with EIA
practitioners, academics, consultants, government officials, and industry representatives in
South Africa. The interviews were structured around a series of questions and the
interviewees were chosen from a large pool of names I compiled last summer while working
in Cape Town.
Three case studies underscore the relevance of the interviews to the larger set of possible
cases. Two of the three cases (Saldanha Steel Project and Strategic Fuel Fund) were selected
based on informal discussions with practitioners and NGOs prior to undertaking my
interviews.2 I e-mailed a number of practitioners and informally polled them concerning
cases they thought were relevant to this study. The third (Melkbosstrand Golf Course) was
suggested by Jonathan Crowther, a consultant, during my interviews.
2 After considerable discussion about whether to include the St. Lucia Dune Mining case into this study, it was
decided to exclude it because it was the largest one done in South Africa and so it was rather unique and
unrepresentative. The bulk of this discussion took place with Dr. Alex Weaver at the Council for Scientific and
Industrial Research (CSIR). For more information on the St. Lucia Dune Mining Case and the lessons learned
from it see "Sustainable development and the environment: lessons from the St. Lucia Environmental Impact
Assessment", Kruger, Wilgen, Weaver and Greyling in South African Journal of Science, Vol. 93. January 1997.
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Criteria for Study
An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) consists of a series of decisions. A review of
how EIAs have influenced overall design plans, through an iterative process prior to the
final decision, underscores their importance. How did the designs and plans for proposals
evolve from conceptualization to their final form as a result of these assessments? While it is
important to examine the impact of EIAs on final decisions, the role of the EIA becomes
even clearer when we examine how it affects decisions prior to final development plans.
The first challenge facing this study is to show how EIAs have been effective. EIAs are
often judged by the result of the final decision. This study examines how ELAs -- as
processes -- affect project plans and designs before final decisions are made. In many of the
cases where EIAs were conducted at an early stage of a proposed development, the EIA
process guided the final outcome by avoiding or mitigating negative environmental impacts.
Evidence from the interviews supports the view that EIAs positively changed project plans
in some cases.
For the purposes of this study, I measure effectiveness by showing that EIAs positively
changed project plans. Additionally I cite examples of developments where EIAs did not
occur and disastrous outcomes followed. This does not mean that the EIA would have
avoided all the impacts, but it would have revealed some of the glaring evidence that could
have saved time and money. In one instance, an EIA that would have easily identified a
major fault line for a proposed coal mining project, was not conducted and the mine was
eventually abandoned after considerable financial loss.
Even in instances where the final decision on the project may be considered flawed (based
on the results of an EIA), there may be adequate evidence to show that the EIA helped
mitigate environmental impacts. The process, with its iterative approach, can affect project
design even in cases where the EIA's terms of reference were so narrowly defined that
almost no alternatives were examined, as the second case study on Saldanha Steel
demonstrates. An examination of the impact of EIAs on the set of decisions prior to the
final one emphasizes the importance of these assessments.
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The second challenge facing this study is demonstrating that a study of voluntary EIAs tells
us something about mandatory EIAs. Since 1989, South Africa had Integrated
Environmental Management (IEM) that provide proponents, practitioners and decision
makers with guidelines and procedures to conduct EIAs. Most of the anecdotal cases (from
interviews as opposed to the case studies) that appear in Chapter 2 followed the IEM
guidelines and procedures for conducting EIAs. Chapter 2 makes a strong argument for the
use of EIAs since those anecdotal cases show what specific aspects of project plans changed
and which environmental impacts were avoided.
While the three case studies in chapter 3 occurred when EIAs were not mandatory, two
important points show how results from the voluntary EIA era can be used to talk about
mandatory ones: (1) all three cases followed the IEM guidelines and procedures for their
EIAs; and (2) a combination of public and official pressure required an EIA before any final
decision on the proposal was made. Section 21 of the Environmental Conservation Act 73
of 1989 allows a government authority to require an EIA for any project it deems necessary
but in general this legal statute has rarely been used. However, in two of the three cases
(Saldanha Steel Project and Melkbosstrand Gold Course), the relevant authority required an
EIA for the proposed project. In the third case (Strategic Fuel Fund (SFF), a state-
sponsored project), the proponent voluntarily committed to an EIA in response to public
pressure.
Since the new law requires EIAs to follow the IEM procedures, and given that the above
three cases followed these procedures, I argue that the three cases illustrate possible
outcomes under a mandatory system. Had these projects been proposed under a mandatory
system, I think that the outcomes would not be very different. In fact, under the new law
project plans may undergo earlier assessments which opens the possibility to influence
project plans earlier in the development phase.
This study demonstrates the following two main points:
(1) EIAs conducted in the past made positive contributions to project plans. Though the
cases discussed are a small subset and may not even be representative, the main point is that
there are a number of cases that show us how environmental impacts were either avoided or
mitigated. Furthermore, there are also cases that show us the disastrous results of projects
where EIAs were not undertaken.
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(2) The three case studies which conducted ElAs following IEM procedures can be treated
comparably to situations where EIAs would be undertaken under a mandatory system
because the authorities required them under Section 21. The positive contributions of these
EIAs should convince us of the importance of EIAs and their potential role, if done
properly, in improving environmental and development decisions.
Since voluntary EIAs have played a significant role in avoiding and mitigating environmental
impacts, mandatory EIAs, if used properly, should be even better for environmental
protection and development decisions in South Africa because they will be conducted for all
major projects. My study shows that the new EIA law may well improve project plans and
their implementation while adding credibility and legitimacy to an environmental
management tool that has the potential to improve most development and environmental
decisions in South Africa.
Chapter 1 looks at the evolution of environmental policy in South Africa. Chapter 2
examines the role of past EIAs in affecting project plans. Here I make the case for
mandatory EIAs and their potential benefit to South Africa using cases cited in the
interviews. Chapter 3 presents the three case studies in considerable detail and examines the
role EIAs played in mitigating and avoiding negative environmental impacts. Chapter 4
presents the lessons learned from past practice and provides a critique of the current state of
EIAs. The paper concludes with general recommendations for ensuring that mandatory
EIAs contribute as much as possible to environmental and developmental decision-making.
Environmental Policy until the 1990s
Historically, all decisions in South Africa were made in a secretive, undemocratic and highly
authoritarian manner. Public participation levels were low, and in cases where the public
was involved, the process was confined to the white population only. This level of decision-
making extended to all elements of South African society, including the environmental
sector. While South Africa placed a heavy emphasis on wildlife conservation and Antarctic
explorations, environmental impacts of public policy and development were never
considered. The country held a very narrow definition of 'environment' and ignored the
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blatant environmental destruction caused by massive development projects, specifically
apartheid's policies.3
Following the passing of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in the United
States in 1970, there were some attempts to experiment with Environmental Impact
Assessments (EIAs) in an informal and voluntary way in South Africa. As environmental
concerns grew in the rest of the world, South Africa flirted with the idea, and over time a
small group of practitioners and academics focused their attention on EIAs and
environmental management.
In 1984, the Council for the Environment, a body that advised the Minister of Environment,
established a committee to recommend a national strategy for integrating environmental
concerns into developmental actions. After a series of meetings and consultations,
Integrated Environmental Management (IEM) procedures were drafted in 1989. IEM is a
process designed to ensure that environmental consequences of development proposals are
understood and adequately considered in the planning process. EIAs are part of this larger
IEM process.
Environmental Policy from 1990-1997
Following the release of all political prisoners in February 1990 and the country's move
towards democratization, South Africa began opening up to new ideas from inside the
country and abroad. This led, in part, to the 1992 restructuring of the Integrated
Environmental Management (IEM) procedures by the Ministry of Environmental Affairs.
IEM guidelines in South Africa improve procedures for undertaking voluntary EIAs. In
South Africa, IEM procedures incorporate an EIA component as part of a larger
environmental management process. 4
In September 1997, the South African cabinet passed an Environmental Impact Assessment
law requiring every major development to undertake an EIA before a decision to proceed
3 For more on apartheid's impact on the environment see Alan Durning's Apartheid's Environmental Toll,
Worldwatch Paper, 1991 and Cock and Koch, Going Green: People, politics and the environment in South
Africa. Oxford University Press, Cape Town. 1991.
4 For a detailed discussion on the evolution of South African environmental policy see Fuggle and Rabie,
Environmental Management in South Africa. Juta & Co., South Africa. 1996.
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with development can be made. Thus, EIAs are now legislated in South Africa, after a
fifteen year history of voluntary ELAs for certain projects.
The EIA process merges environmental protection and human health questions with
economic development and job creation. I believe that this process provides an avenue to
discuss and evaluate often conflicting views about the environment and development. This
newly legitimized avenue provides a framework and space to allow all the interested and
affected parties to air their views and concerns on a proposed project while influencing the
direction of the study of impacts.
Integrated Environmental Management lEM5
Integrated Environmental Management (IEM) is designed to ensure that the environmental
consequences of development proposals are understood and adequately considered in the
planning process. The term environment is used in its broad sense, encompassing biophysical
and socio-economic components. The purpose of IEM is to resolve or mitigate any
negative impacts and to enhance positive aspects of development proposals. In the 1990s,
these principles and guidelines have been used in an ad hoc manner. Increasingly, more
practitioners are following this procedure.
The principles of IEM are:
- informed decision making;
- accountability for information on which decisions are taken;
- accountability for decisions taken;
- a broad meaning given to the term environment (i.e. one that includes physical, biological,
social, economic, cultural, historical and political components);
- an open, participatory approach in the planning of proposals;
* consultation with interested and affected parties;
- due consideration of alternative options;
- an attempt to mitigate negative impacts and enhance positive aspects of proposals;
- an attempt to ensure that the 'social costs' of development proposals (those borne by
society, rather than the developers) be outweighed by the 'social benefits' (benefits to society
as a result of the actions of the developers);
5 The following section on IEM including the diagram in Figure 1 is based entirely on information provided by
the Integrated Environmental Management Guideline Series, Department of Environment Affairs, 1992.
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- democratic regard for individual rights and obligations;
- compliance with these principles during all stages of the planning, implementation and
decommissioning of proposals (i.e. from 'cradle to grave'), and
- the opportunity for public and specialist input in the decision-making process.
The IEM procedure comprises of the following three stages: plan and assess proposal;
decision and; implementation. I will discuss the details of the three stages here (see Figure 1
for the schematic version of IEM).
Stage 1: Plan and Assess Proposal
The following steps are recommended in the developing the proposal:
- notify neighbours and other interested and affected parties;
- establish policy requirements;
- establish legal requirements;
- establish administrative requirements;
- establish purpose for the proposal;
- consider IEM requirements;
- consult with authorities;
- consult with interested and affected parties;
- identify and consider alternatives;
- identify and consider issues, opportunities and constraints for alternatives;
- consider mitigatory options;
- consider management plan options.
The Classification ofProposal stage determines whether the proposal follows the Impact
Assessment, InitialAssessment or No FormalAssessment route. The classification is determines by
the proponent and his/her consultant, in consultation with relevant authorities. If
significant impacts are envisaged during the Develop Proposal phase then the project will
undergo an Impact Assessment. If the proposal is included in the list of activities in the law or
if there is uncertainty about the impacts, then the proposal will undergo an InitialAssessment.
The proposal can go directly to Authoriy Review if the proposal meets planning requirements
and no significant impacts will result. Provision is made for any objections to the proposal
by interested and affected parties.
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Figure 1: The IEM Procedure6
Stage 1:
Plan and Assess
Proposal
Stage 2:
Decion
Stage 3:
Implementation Formal authorityinvolvement
Recommended steps
P ibkl tf
n Required steps
6 Source: Integrated Environmental Management Guideline Series, Department of Environment Affairs, 1992.
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The InitialAssessment is an investigation which is undertaken to obtain just enough
information to determine whether or not there will be significant impacts. It is undertaken
by a competent part (an individual, or group of individuals with the necessary expertise to
assess whether significant impacts will occur. After this, if it is determined that an Impact
Assessment must occur then the Scoping, Investigation and Reporting stages form the basis for
this assessment. There is an emphasis on examining feasible alternatives under the
Investigation. If the authorities are not satisfied with the proposal under the No Formal
Assessment route, then they will require an InitialAssessment.
Stage 2: Decision
Should the authority (and where required, specialists and/or the public) be satisfied that
sufficient information is provided in order to make a decision, that sufficient consultation
with interested and affected parties has taken place, and that the proposal complies with
requirements, then a decision as to the acceptability of the proposal should be taken. If the
proposal is approved, there will be clearly specified Conditions ofApproval. It may be
desirable to include an Management Plan to describe how the proposal will be implemented,
how environmental restoration after construction will be carried out, or provide for the final
rehabilitation of the environment on termination or decommissioning of the project. An
Environmental Contract might also be required, whereby penalties for not adhering to the
Conditions ofApproval are agreed upon.
Whether or not the proposal is approved, there should be a Record of Decision. Where
appropriate, an explanation of how environmental considerations were taken into account
and weighed against other considerations must be documented. The authority must provide
and opportunity for appeal.
Stage 3: Implementation
On approval, the proposal may be implemented. The requirements of the Conditions of
Approval need to be adhered to during implementation. A monitoring program should be
required for all approved proposals, irrespective of whether there is a Management Plan
and/or Environmental Contract. Aspects to be covered in Monitoring include verification of
impact predictions, appraisal of mitigatory measures, adherence to approved plans, and
compliance with conditions of approval. Periodic assessments of the positive and negative
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impacts of proposals should be undertaken. These will serve to provide instructive feedback
on the adequacy of planning at the earlier stages.
The essence of the revised IEM procedure is that an Impact Assessment is either
undertaken, or is not necessary. The intended message is that careful planning,
incorporating the necessary assessment, will expedite the process, and facilitate informed
decision-making.
Literature Review
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) are designed, in theory, to inform decisions on
projects that have potential impacts on the environment. EIAs should also influence
project plans and designs to mitigate adverse environmental impacts for projects that do go
forward. In practice, however, EIAs have been used to justify plans and decisions already
underway or have been introduced at a very late stage of the development process.
Having an EIA law with impressive guidelines and procedures is useless unless the
government is committed to implementation and continuous monitoring of environmental
impacts. In their study on EIAs, Jain et al point out:
"Observers find several general tendencies in the application of EA
in developing countries which limit its effectiveness. Assessments are
undertaken too late in the planning to contribute to decision making
and are used instead to confirm that the environmental consequences
of the project are acceptable. The environmental management plans
in the EIS documents are often not carried out, and there is no
mechanism for monitoring compliance." (Jain et al, 1993, p179)
The literature on EIAs is quite unanimous that the EIA's role and function is to inform
decision makers about the choices they face. Considerable attention has been placed on the
"cause-effect" relationship between the EIA and the final decision. However, it is now
accepted that EIAs are not purely scientific and objective studies. Susskind and Dunlap
(1981) remind us that non-objective judgments always enter into EIAs and encourage
practitioners and decision makers to identify the non-objective judgments involved.
For example, other decision-making constraints include those within the political and
bureaucratic structures themselves. Andrews and Waits argue that "Administrative decisions
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are not isolated and discreet actions, but sequences of actions embedded in larger structures
and longer processes of organized behavior." (Andrews and Waits, 1978, p55). They go on
to state that various interactive processes influence decisions from the political angle since
sections of the public lobby, organize and influence the political process. In the case of
EIAs, the decision makers are more likely to be influenced by the politics or economics of a
proposal than by the results of the EIA.
Bureaucratic structures on the other hand compete for "jurisdiction" with other agencies,
narrowly define statutes or mandates and even do everything in their power to protect their
own interests and power (Andrews and Waits, 1978). Government ministries and
departments often struggle over who evaluates the EIA and decides on the final project
rather than combining their expertise to improve the decision.
Since a number of other factors like political, economic and social pressures eventually
influence the final decision, I think that proving the causal relationship of EIAs effects on
the final decision is futile. This is not to say that EIAs play no role in influencing the final
decision. They can and do. This 'final' decision is not the only decision made in the overall
process and often too much emphasis is placed on the end result. A 1996 United Nations
Environmental Program Report reiterates that very point, stating:
"It is a common failing to focus all attention on any 'final' approval
decision as the main or only way of ensuring an environmentally
sensitive project. A final approval is important, but if ElAs are
undertaken throughout project life-cycles then the importance of this
decision may, in some cases, decline. However, it remains true that,
at a 'final' approval stage, all aspects including the environment are
considered, and trade-offs made. Often, a 'final' approval decision is
crucial and a special mechanism may be needed to encourage
decision makers to include EIA results in their deliberations and
decisions." (UNEP Report, 1996, p1 3)
Much of the literature on EIAs in developing countries notes that the lack of a legal
framework, lack of experience, lack of environmental awareness, and lack of trained
professionals hinder the implementation of EIAs. This serious lack of institutional capacity
coupled with "institutional constraints such as emission standards for air quality control,
effluent standards for wastewater discharge, and noise pressure levels for acceptable land
uses" further erodes the effectiveness of EIAs (Jain et al, 1993, 148). ETA laws do not have
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standards written into them and without any meaningful environmental protection
standards, any EIA is a waste of time and resources.
Fuggle has argued that South Africa's isolation during the apartheid years actually had some
positive effects when it came to developing assessment techniques. The IEM procedure, he
argues:
"is not environmental protection per se, but regulated environmental
use to meet set goals. This is a different point of departure to that of
the industrialized world. The implication is that from the outset the
purpose of environmental assessment carried out within IEM is to
enhance plans or projects, to suggest ways in which environmental
effects can be mitigated, and to ensure that no person or group is
worse off after completion of the plan or project that they were
before it was initiated" (Fuggle, 1995, p6 5).
He notes that in the industrialized countries where EIAs have been in use, they are seen as
anti-development, whereas IEM "seeks to modify and improve activities, it does not set out
to stop them. The IEM process is not designed to facilitate projects being stopped. It seeks
to encourage project modification so that any consequential environmental effects are
benign. It is pro-sustainable management and utilization and is not predicated to be anti-
development" (Fuggle, 1995, p65).
Historically, most EIAs in South Africa were conducted to justify an economic development
and rarely were alternatives considered. An EIA with a good public participation model
allows the possibility of alternatives (other than those proposed by the proponent and EIA
preparer) to be seriously and legitimately considered (ain et al, 1993). Choosing which
alternatives to study becomes another issue that comes with its own set of constraints.
Lawrence Bacow draws our attention to the feasibility of studying the various alternatives.
He observes that "some alternatives are feasible in concept but are infeasible given the time
frame available for evaluation and decision" (Bacow, 1980, p1 13). EIAs have to respect a
time frame so that developments with minimum environmental impacts are not stalled.
EIAs have been known to be so contentious that if five people were asked for their opinions
on EIAs, it should come as no surprise to anyone if ten opinions were given.
Environmental values frequently lie at the heart of many of these controversies. Unless the
differing values and interests are acknowledged and dealt with, EIAs and the decisions that
stem from them Will continue to be undermined.
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Bacow reminds us that:
"no matter how many alternatives an agency considers, it will still be
criticized for not considering enough if people disagree over the
objectives of the project. No matter how conscientious and impartial
the agency is in assessing impacts...its final decision will not be
popularly supported if people disagree over the procedures used to
balance competing interests" (Bacow, 1980, p122).
While it is important to highlight the value and constraints of EIAs, I want to caution that
they not be viewed as the only tool to implement any change in the environmental decision-
making. Many factors influence decisions and this review covers the key themes that tend to
emerge when the impact of EIAs are discussed. They are also themes that emerge in this
study and the accompanying case studies.
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II. Lessons learned from past EIAs
At the 15th annual International Association of Impact Assessment in 1995, John Kakonge
succinctly stated that,
"Without mandatory guidelines, the EL process is doomed to ad
hoc and arbitrary implementation. Most industrial countries have
developed a legal framework for the EIA process. Similar legal
backing is required for the implementation of EIAs in developing
countries. In the absence of a legal framework, other developmental
pressures take over making the EIA process somewhat nebulous and
ineffective. However, the form that the EIA legislation should take
would of course need to bear domestic realities in mind. Simply
copying US legislation, for example, may be entirely inappropriate."
(Kakonge, 1995, p43)
South Africa recently underwent the very process outlined above by Kakonge and now has a
legal framework for evaluating environmental impacts, but a legal framework alone cannot
ensure effective EIAs. South Africa can benefit from hindsight and the past experiences of
fifteen years of practice using voluntary ELAs, to provide lessons and inform future practice.
Using short, anecdotal cases provided through interviews, this chapter examines the role
voluntary ETAs have played in the past by examining their impacts on project designs in
South Africa. The following chapter presents in detail the three main cases studies analyzed
in this paper.
Why was there a voluntary/informal process?
Over the past five to ten years, many companies that were engaged in international trade
came under pressure to demonstrate an environmental sensibility in their project plans.
Many transnationals felt the effects of growing international tide of opinion and practice, the
use of ISO 14000, and most importantly the foreign markets (mainly European consumers)
that were becoming increasingly aware of environmental issues. Many of the companies that
undertook voluntary ETAs correctly speculated that South Africa would sooner or later pass
an EIA law (given the Integrated Environmental Management Guidelines issued by the
Department of Environment and Tourism in 1989 and then revised in 1992).
There were also other possible advantages to submitting projects to an EIA. For some,
experience with EIAs would short-circuit the learning curve and give them an edge over
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other companies once mandatory EIA regulations came into effect. Familiarity with the
guidelines and process may save valuable time for future projects that may require EIAs and
also allows proponents to submit their suggestions to any future redrafting of IEM. For
others, EIAs could be used as a bargaining tool with the authorities for ether developmental
concessions. A company that conducts a voluntary EIA (regardless of the quality of the
EIA) can make a strong case to the authorities about its commitment to the environment
and quality of life, which in turn may lead to other concessions that the company really
wants: permits for a longer time-frame, easier permit renewals, quicker re-zoning, larger
floor-area-ratio for buildings, and even indemnity from other standards that may apply to the
project.
An often cited example where is the proposal for the Alusaf Hillside Smelter at Richards Bay
in northern Natal, on South Africa's eastern coast. The company, Alusaf, spent millions of
rands on an extensive EIA process that was not required by law. In fact, Alusaf had not
even bought a site. They chose to go through the EIA alternatives before acquiring the land
needed for the smelter. In this case, the company was aiming its product at the mainly
European export markets and had to account for international environmental awareness of
product manufacturing. 7 Alusaf s proposed development took place in 1997 on the heels of
a very controversial dune mining proposal by another company, Richards Bay Minerals.
A combination of wanting to avoid the mistakes made by the Richards Bay Minerals
company for dune mining, and recognizing the need to cater to the international markets,
resulted in Alusafs decision to conduct an EIA. The controversial proposal to mine the
dunes at St. Lucia produced a lengthy EIA process and set norms for future developments in
the area. Rather than get embroiled in a lengthy and expensive process, Alusaf made a
strategic decision to conduct an EIA at the earliest possible stage of their planning.
Increasing consumer demand, especially from the European markets, has come to the
attention of some of the big companies which intend to capitalize on this consumer
awareness. Many European consumers are increasingly asking questions about the
environmental impacts of the products they buy. EIAs can help avoid blatant environmental
impacts that would otherwise be ignored and may potentially damage the product's
reputation. In some cases, conducting an EIA has been part of company policy. This is
7 Interview with Richard Fuggle, 1998.
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more common among transnational companies where broad policy decisions were made in
Europe or North America.
Historically, there has also been pressure from environmental groups and journalists who
have written about proposed developments and their potential environmental impacts.
Environmental pressure groups have often highlighted proposals through the media which
in turn grabbed the attention of political officials. Some controversial projects reported in
the media have forced the Minister to invoke Section 21 of the Environmental Conservation
Act of 1989 and thus require a report of environmental impacts of the proposed
development.8 For example, competent authorities asked for EIAs for the proposed St.
Lucia Dune Mining and the Saldanha Steel Project.
In addition to Section 21 and international market pressure, the EIAs themselves have
changed the attitudes of many companies in South Africa. Companies undergoing the
process of conducting an EIA were affected in the way they ultimately planned and made
decisions about proposed projects. For instance, Richards Bay Minerals was forced to deal
with a new level of transparency through the controversial St. Lucia Dune Mining EIA. This
particular EIA alerted many corporations to EIAs and how they can be used to stop
developments. Many companies were glad not to be in the shoes of Richards Bay Minerals
and paid attention to this EIA in order to learn from the experience.
Interestingly, some local city councils had an EIA policy before it became national policy.
Most local projects are visible and local authorities tend to be held more accountable to
decisions. Local authorities are more accessible than provincial or national authorities and
so they can easily be asked difficult questions about developments. Local councils used
EIAs to justify projects that they favoured. Since no particular process was mandated, the
proponent could easily prepare an in-house report for the council. Having an EIA on file
with the local authorities, regardless of its contents, gave credibility to the decision. The EIA
was nothing more than a rubber-stamp for a project.
8 Initially the Act did not specify a process for this report. By 1989, authorities were asking proponents to use
the IEM procedures to compile the report.
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How did the EIAs affect project plans?
Initially, in the early 1970s, most voluntary EIAs were conducted after the project design
stage. EIAs were merely rubber-stamps for projects that were already underway. As time
passed, proponents who conducted voluntary ELAs began to see their value during project
planning. In most cases cited in my interviews, the project plans changed (some slightly and
others significantly) because of the recommendations in the EIAs. In most cases, the
recommendations that were implemented were ones most convenient and expedient to the
proponent. The least costly recommendations were often the first ones to be implemented.
Proponents are more likely to add measures to save some of the flora than to examine
technology alternatives.
All the interviewees agreed that the EIAs stopped certain damage from occurring. A
number of situations detailed below, were observed where an EIA had not been conducted,
resulting in disastrous consequences for the development. In contentious cases like St. Lucia
Dune Mining and Saldanha Steel Project, the projects were large and the national or
provincial authority had asked for an EIA before making a final decision. The contentious
nature of the projects attracted considerable media and public attention, resulting in
pressures on the authorities to ask for an environmental assessment. For example, when the
Saldanha Steel Project (Case Study #2) was proposed, many environmental NGOs publicly
opposed the project and the provincial authority called for an EIA following the
controversy.
Numerous interviewees stated that those proponents who volunteered to conduct EIAs
were already committed to following some of the recommendations that came out of them.
While some EIAs were conducted to serve as 'rubber-stamps' for proposed projects, others
were done with an interest in making sound environmental decisions. All the practitioners
interviewed mentioned the intensive screening process they used to avoid conducting EIAs
for 'rubber-stamp' purposes. The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), for
example, turned away about eighty percent of the EIA requests because they wanted to
protect their integrity and reputation as EIA practitioners and had felt that the proponent
was seeking easy approval for a proposal.9
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9 Interview with Alex Weaver, 1998.
Over the past four to six years, practitioners have begun asking proponents to sign a letter of
commitment to follow the recommendations of an ETA (with a built-in appeals clause). The
letter of commitment concept evolved in the absence of a legal framework, because
practitioners felt that their recommendations were not being taken seriously by project
proponents. Similarly, EIA recommendations were not adequately considered by the
decision makers and rarely made it into the conditions of approval.
Many of the voluntary EIAs conducted after 1990 went through a consultative process.
After looking at the initial proposal, practitioners made numerous recommendations prior to
a scoping phase. In cases where obvious alternatives existed, those were presented to the
proponent ahead of time. Questions asked during the scoping phase allowed the proponent
to make further adjustments. After the draft EIS was prepared and presented for public
review, elements not covered by the EIA were highlighted -- offering still other
opportunities for change. The public review phase provided a legitimate avenue for
alternatives proposed by other parties to be considered. By the time the final report reached
the decision maker, a number of avenues to implement changes in project designs had been
presented. This is not to say that every EIA process produced a tension-free dialogue. Nor
did proponents make changes at every opportunity available.
What can be said, however, is that some EIAs affected project plans dramatically while
others produced only few key changes. Rarely did proponents accept all the
recommendations that emerged from an ETA. In general, the interviewees felt comfortable
with the changes accepted by the proponent. Even in the controversial and politically
charged cases, where practitioners were more wary of the impacts of an ETA, they pointed
to the key recommendations they made which could have changed the final outcome, had
they been taken seriously.
The St. Lucia Dune Mining case was very controversial. Richards Bay Minerals wanted to
mine one of the world's largest vegetated sand dunes. The public outcry, following the
publication of the initial impact assessment by the proponent, resulted in a cabinet decision
to undertake an ETA in September 1989. After months of consultations and specialist
reports, the Review Panel made its recommendation in December 1993. The final decision
by the government was made public in May 1996 (Kruger et al, 1997). In this case, the
national government did not grant permission to mine based on the ETA.
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After the EIA process at Alusaf's Hillside Smelter in Richards Bay, the plant was relocated to
a site the company had not previously considered. The EIA examined various alternative
sites and Alusaf decided to purchase additional land at the most suitable site for the smelter
(based on the EIA).10
Another occasion where voluntary EIAs affected project outcomes occurred in Cape Town,
where Table Mountain has been the major attractions for years. South Africans and
foreigners alike stand in long lines to take the cable car up this national monument. In 1997,
John Harrison, a developer, decided to upgrade the cable car system to carry more people in
less time up and down the mountain. The National Parks Board wanted an independent
consultant to lead the environmental management process during the Table Mountain Cable
Car upgrade. The National Parks Board asked Gibb Africa to prepare an environmental
management plan. John Harrison appointed Crowther, Campbell and Associates to manage
the public participation process.
One significant factor to mention here is that most of the white communities living around
the mountain have a strong connection with it. In some ways, they all think it belongs to
them. When one experiences the awe of this massive rock, one can understand this
sentiment. There is very little one can do on and around the mountain without high levels
of public scrutiny. So when the proposal to upgrade the cable car was made public, voices
and opinions were raised from all around the city and country.
The cable way company committed itself from the outset to follow the integrated
environmental guidelines and to conduct an EIA.11 The major problems identified with the
cable care upgrade were:
- the public protested the visual impact of the new water tanks that would sit on top of the
mountain (this is a flat mountain).
- people were concerned about the pathways on the top of the mountain and their impact on
the vegetation (fynbos).
- the new cable car's capacity was increased from 27 people to 65 which posed a parking
problem on Kloofnek at the bottom of the mountain and adjacent to a wealthy white
community.
10 Interview with Alex Weaver, 1998.
11 E-mail correspondence with Jonathan Crowther, 17 April 1998.
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- the sewage and waste disposal from the new restaurant would have to be dealt with.12
The EIA produced several environmentally positive outcomes. The proponent was asked to
move the water reservoirs underground and to be responsible for sewage
disposal/treatment. The client agreed to this although they later breached this agreement.
Eventually, after considerable public pressure, the tanks were placed underground and a
system to monitor the sewage was installed. The sewage is predicted to have little effect on
surrounding vegetation. They have agreed to put a pipeline to the base if the sewage poses a
problem. A lot of the design work for the sewage problems was based on the EIA's
recommendations.13 The refuse rooms are to be kept cool and the waste will be baled and
taken down at night for disposal. Because the previous pathways were unclear and did not
go out to the edge of the mountain, people disturbed the vegetation by making their own
paths to the edge. Now the pathways are more visible so people will stick to them. They
also created a pathway on the periphery of the mountain and linked the outside route
through the middle.14
Gibb Africa had an environmental control officer on the mountain at all times during
construction. The National Parks Board paid Gibb Africa but claimed the money from
Harrison, the developer. During construction a chemical spill occurred on the face of the
mountain that Harrison had to resolve immediately by hiring professional mountain-climbers
to assist in the clean-up operation. They also had to ensure the protection of the fynbos
(threatened indigenous vegetation to the Cape) on the mountain. If it were not for the
environmental manager on site, the problems would have been far worse. In conclusion,
had it not been for the EIA, the above issues would probably not have been identified or
dealt with.15 The EIA forced environmental issues to be discussed and mitigation options to
be considered.
Not far from Table Mountain, an old navy town called Simonstown sits quietly along False
Bay. A study was conducted for the Simonstown Municipality regarding a potential
development of Redhill (between Simonstown and Scarborough). The original intent of the
development proposal was to build a golf course and hotel along with high cost housing.
12 Interview with Neil Carter, 1998.
13 Interview with Neil Carter, 1998.
14 Interview with Neil Carter, 1998 and Jonathan Crowther, 1998.
15 Interview with Neil Carter, 1998.
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The municipality owned the land which was designated for low-middle cost housing. An
EIA was conducted and the recommendation was not to develop the area, but to push for
conservation-oriented development. The municipality followed this recommendation and
rejected the development proposal -- a decision that was informed by the EIA.16
In yet another case, a proposed dam project was stopped as a result of an EIA. The Paarl
Municipality buys water from the Cape Metropolitan Council. A recent bulk water study
looked at the feasibility of damming the nearby White River. The section of the river that
was to be dammed is pristine and is frequently used for fishing and recreation. If Ninam
Shand, the consulting engineers, did not have an environmental consultant, the engineers
would have found a way to dam the river. The Paarl Municipality stuck to the IEM process
and, based on the EIA, recommended against the dam construction.17
On another occasion, Neil Carter from Gibb Africa was involved in the extension of the Du
Toit's Kloof Road. When Carter examined the plans for the extension, he realized that the
construction traffic and excavation would result in heavy silting and pollution of the nearby
river. His intervention led to the decision not to pump any of the construction water into
the clean river, which was used for trout fishing and irrigation. His environmental concern
protected the river through the construction phase.18
My interviews also revealed cases where the lack of an EIA or not following an EIA proved
to be disastrous. This was tougher to prove since interviewees had to think of projects that
no one in the field was involved with (since no EIAs were conducted).19 However, a few
cases emerged. For example, in Rooiels, the military's missile testing site did not undertake
an EIA and had to shut down after contamination problems arose.2 Mossgas, a major
governmental natural gas project to pipe natural gas through vast areas of the country, did
not require an EIA. Had an EIA been conducted, the final results might have been different
16 Interview with Steven Granger and Peter Tomalin, 1998.
17 Interview with Steven Granger and Peter Tomalin, 1998.
18 Interview with Neil Carter, 1998.
19 It should be noted that a few of the interviewees commented on the recent V&A Waterfront Development
(Mall and Hotel on the waterfront) which did not undertake an EIA but the outcome was one that everyone
was happy with. One reason for this is that the Waterfront development had to consider the immediate
environment of the harbour and water for the project to be successful and so they built that into their project
plans.
2 Interview with Alex Weaver, 1998.
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and it is very likely that the gas would not have been allowed to be piped through sensitive
ecological areas and inhabited communities.21
The N2 National Highway routing through Wilderness is yet another situation where an EIA
might have made a difference. Aware that developing this coastal route would greatly
benefit his constituency, the then Prime Minister P. W. Botha decided to build the road from
Storm River to George along the Eastern Cape coast. Environmentalists wanted the road
to run along the plateau in order to avoid disruption of the sensitive coastline. No EIA of
the construction and operational phase of the project was undertaken, and Botha decided
that the road would be built along the coast.22 In recent years, environmentalists have
expressed concern about the road's effects on the coast line and the rise in development
along this corridor.
An EIA was undertaken for the Knysna Golf Course development on the Eastern Cape
coast along the Garden Route. The EIA's recommendation was to develop one hole at a
time given the environmental conditions in the area. The developer was not prepared to
extend the time-line and Jack Nicklaus, the designer, could only make one or two trips to
South Africa. The recommendation was ignored and land was cleared for all the holes.
Soon thereafter, heavy rains flooded the area and all the soil in the area washed into the
lagoon. This was a significant set-back to the developer who may yet abandon the project.23
Eskom is a state-owned electricity generator and supplier. Most of South Africa's energy is
produced through the burning of high sulfur coal. The Eskom Majuba Plant failed to look
at the natural earth faults for their coal mine, and Eskom had to abandon this mining project
after considerable expenses were already made. Had an EIA been conducted, Eskom would
have known in the preliminary stage that the fault lines would pose a danger to their
operation as well as to the miners. 24
The short cases presented in this chapter show specific ways in which either 1) EIAs allowed
input that helped influence better environmental decisions, 2) EIA recommendations that
were not followed resulted in negative outcomes, or 3) not conducting an EIA resulted in
21 Interview with Tony Barbour, 1998.
22 Interview with Tony Barbour, 1998.
23 Interview with David Shandler, 1998.
24 Interview with Karen Ireton, 1998.
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disastrous environmental and financial outcomes. Although decision makers rarely have the
capacity to use the information produced by the EIAs to make informed decisions (and
EIAs typically have little impact on final decisions), final project plans can undergo
considerable change before reaching the decision maker's desk. In other words, the process of
conducting an EIA is as important as the outcome, precisely because the EIA can produce
opportunities along the way for mitigating alternatives to be considered, for the public to
express their concerns and propose areas of study and to propose alternatives, for
companies to reconsider their plans, and for government authorities to at least have some
information available to inform decisions.
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III. Impacts of ElAs in three cases
The following three case studies are ones where an authority did ask for an EIA to be
conducted. For purposes of this study, I argue that since these were required EIAs, they
served the same purpose as a mandatory EIAs. In each case, the competent authority
requested an EIA for the development. What is significant about these three is that they all
followed the IEM guidelines and procedures in conducting their assessments. These are the
same guidelines and procedures recommended by the new legislation. If these three projects
were proposed after September 1997, I feel that the EIAs for each would not have been any
different.
The first case looks at a golf course development in Melkbosstrand where part of the
property was designated for conservation. The second examines the siting of a major steel
mill in Saldanha Bay, an ecologically sensitive area. The third examines the options available
to maximize an under-utilized state asset, the Strategic Fuel Fund.
I want to stress the fact that despite the final decision in each case, the EIA played a
significant role in:
- bringing the project to people's attention and thus providing important information to the
public;
- influencing parts of the project design and plans;
- raising the need for continued monitoring through an environmental management system
of some kind.
In each of the three cases, significant environmental impacts were avoided or mitigated. In
the Saldanha Steel Mill case, the final decision to permit the siting of the mill a mere 4
kilometers away from the bay, ignored the recommendations contained in the EIA.
However, an independent environmental audit of the project suggests that many of the
conditions of approval, other than the location of the plant, were compliant with the
findings and recommendations of the EIA.
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Case 1: Melkbosstrand Golf Course
This case shows how the EIA process helped the developer of the golf course with housing
estate set aside the necessary 140 hectares of land for nature conservation and continue
construction. This process had active public participation and it is evident from the attached
diagrams that the final outcome responded to most of the concerns raised.
In 1994, the Melkbosstrand Local Council rezoned Erf 1694 to allow for the development of
a golf village. Following the rezoning, the Council put out a proposal call for development
of a 18 hole golf course and associated facilities, hotel and up to a 1,595 residential units on a
portion of Erf 1694. Erf 1694 is an area of approximately 384 hectares of which 160
hectares is being considered for development. Within the southern section of this erf the
proposal call stated that 140 hectares of land should be excluded from the golf village
development for inclusion into the adjacent proposed Blouberg Nature Reserve. The
proposal submitted by CAVCOR Property Developers and RABIE Properties was accepted
by the Council. Subsequently Johnnic Property Developments had taken the lead role in this
development consortium.
While this process was going on, the Cape Metropolitan Council (CMC) was also planning
for the establishment of the Blouberg Nature Reserve. As part of this process, the National
Monuments Council (NMC) became involved and in 1996 declared a Conservation Area on
the publicly owned land within this area between Melkbosstrand and Bloubergstrand which
included the southern portion of Erf 1694.
To resolve the discrepancy between the boundaries of the proposed golf village
development and the Conservation Area, discussions were held with various interested and
affected parties (I&APs) and authorities in late 1996. It was subsequently agreed that a golf
village could be developed on Erf 1694 on the condition that the developer appoint an
independent consultant to conduct an EIA. This EIA was to assess the environmental
impact of the proposed development and to determine the best environmental option for
the boundary of 140 hectares area of land to be excised from the development for inclusion
into the proposed nature reserve.
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Johnnic's planning consultants had undertaken a baseline environmental study without any
specific request from the Municipality. The EIA that was undertaken by Crowther,
Campbell and Associates resulted from pressure put on the developer by environmental
NGOs and the provincial conservation authority. 5 In March 1997, Crowther Campbell &
Associates (CCA) were appointed by the developer to undertake the EIA.
Option 1
The design layout, Option 1, was prepared and attached to the agreement of sale (May 1996)
for the portion of Erf 1694 planned for development. This layout included pockets of
strandveld that made up part of the 140 hectares to be incorporated into the Blouberg
Nature Reserve. Figure 2 clearly shows that the 140 hectares are made up of small pockets
of land all over the development. The sum of all these pockets add up to 140 hectares.
At a 19 December 1996 meeting of key I&APs, it was agreed that the area of 140 hectares
should be excluded from the proposed development as a single unit. This required a
redrafting of the plans where the 140 hectares were carved out as a single unit. As a result,
Option 2 was proposed.
Option 2
A proposed envelope within which a workable golf course could be designed was put
forward by the developer and presented to I&APs during the scoping stage. This option
allowed for a working golf course and made provisions for the 140 hectares to be included in
the proposed adjacent nature reserve as a single unit. See Figure 3.
Option 2 was presented by the proponent when the EIA began. This option was used as the
basis against which specialists were to assess the preferred 140 hectares for the inclusion into
the nature reserve.
Option 3
After collating information from the specialist studies, the developer proposed Option 3.
This envelope and layout, Figure 4, considered some of the issues identified in the specialist
studies. This option took into account the following:
- prevention of continuous development along the fore dune ridges
25 E-mail correspondence with Jonathan Crowther, 17 April 1998.
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Figure 2: Layout for Option 1z
2 Source: Environmental Impact Assessment for the Proposed Melkbosstrand Golf Village Development,
Prepared by Crowther Campbell & Associates, June 1997, p16 .
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Figure 3: Layout for Option 2z
ERF 268 BLAAUBERGSTRANO
WEST COAST ROAD
-
7 Source: Environmental Impact Assessment for the Proposed Melkbosstrand Golf Village Development,
Prepared by Crowther Campbell & Associates, June 1997, p17.
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Figure 4: Layout for Option 32
2 Source: Environmental Impact Assessment for the Proposed Melkbosstrand Golf Village Development,
Prepared by Crowther Campbell & Associates, June 1997, p18.
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- allowance for a natural corridor along the western and eastern boundary of the site to
facilitate movement of fauna between the surrounding nature reserve
- provision of an increased buffer zone between the scenic route (Otto du Plessis Drive) and
the development.
A meeting with the project team and the EIA specialists was held to discuss Option 3. As a
result of this meeting, Option 4 was developed since some of the specialists had conflicting
requirements and some compromise was sought.
Option 4
The most significant changes to this layout, as seen in Figure 5, are:
- The golf course and village act as a buffer between the West Coast Road (R27) and the
nature reserve, rather than vice versa.
- the vegetation of the area planned for the development in the south eastern portion of the
site has a lower conservation status than the Dwarf Thicket Strandveld on the western side
of the site.
The main characteristics of the nature reserve's layout include:
- The inclusion of a greater area of Dwarf Thicket Strandveld (highest conservation status)
into the nature reserve.
- The provision of a substantial vegetation corridor along the coast between the reserve and
Melkbosstrand.
- The provision of a corridor for animal movement across the R27.
- The maintenance of an open vista from the Blouberg Hills to the sea.
The main characteristics of the proposed changes to the golf course are:
- A substantial set-back distance from Otto du Plessis Drive which would minimize the
visual impact of the development.
- A working golf course with a variety of natural elements which would limit changes to the
landscape.
- The provision of a green corridor along the R27 with development set-back some distance
from the R27.
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Figure 5: Layout for Option 42
2 Source: Environmental Impact Assessment for the Proposed Melkbosstrand Golf Village Development,
Prepared by Crowther Campbell & Associates, June 1997, p2 0.
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Figure 6: Envelopes for each Development Optionw
Source: Environmental Impact Assessment for the Proposed Melkbosstrand Golf Village Development,
Prepared by Crowther Campbell & Associates, June 1997, p2 2.
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It was agreed that this option would allow for the provision of 140 hectares as a single unit
with the greatest environmental benefit. Figure 5 illustrates the fourth option and how it
changed through the EIA process. Figure 6 allows us to compare the four options by
showing the boundaries of the 4 options on the development envelope.
This case demonstrates how a developer can comply with a given requirement without
meeting the goals and objectives of that requirement. The proponent, Johnnic Properties,
found a way to set aside 140 hectares of conservation area within the development envelope
without making any significant changes to their project plans (Option 1). Option 1 set aside
the required 140 hectares in isolated pockets that would hardly contribute to the
municipalities' goals of creating a conservation area. The December 1996 meeting with
I&APs was significant because it recommended that the 140 hectares be a single unit.
Option 2 carved out the 140 hectares as a single unit.
The Draft Scoping Report was issued in mid-March 1997 and another workshop was held
with I&APs to address concerns with the scoping report. The specialist studies were
commissioned after this workshop with I&APs. The Botanical Society of South Africa
strongly pushed for the vegetation study to include the southern boundary of the property
(the Society's submission claims that this was discussed at the December 1996 meeting but
was not included in the terms of reference for the botanist in the Scoping Report) 31. It was
agreed that the specialist vegetation study would integrate the southern boundary within the
overall vegetation study. This is an important point because the final option included the
western part of the southern boundary as part of the conservation area given its plant quality
over the eastern part.
This golfing estate's original plan included 1,595 residential units (Draft Scoping Report for
the Melkbosstrand Gold Village Development, 1997). The Table View Residents
Association was most concerned about the impact of the increased traffic due to the increase
in households. A traffic study was conducted and the final outcome was to restrict the use
of the West Coast Road entrance exclusively for hotel guests, club house members, and
maintenance traffic. This road will not provide any access to the residential area. The
residents will have two entrances -- one on the proposed Birkenhead Drive Extension and
31 The Botanical Society of South Africa's written submission to the Melkbosstrand Golf Course Development
EIA, 24 March 1997.
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the other on Otto Du Plessis Drive (Melkbosstrand Golf Village Site Development Plan,
1997).
Due to the winds in the area, the fairways had to be kept narrower than plpnned to protect
the vegetation from wind damage. The narrowing of the fairways further increased the area
of natural vegetation. This concern was voiced at one of the public meetings and the final
plan has narrowed all the fairways. The course will cover an area of about 73 hectares of
which about 20 hectares will remain undisturbed (Executive Summary, Melkbosstrand Golf
Village Development EIA, 1997).
The visual impacts of the development was a concern for those who live in the area and
enjoy the scenic drive along the coast. As a result of the visual impact study, the
recommendation was to carefully consider the location of housing units along the western
dune of the golf village. Another recommendation was to limit the height of buildings to
single storey in these sensitive areas.
The final plan was approved by the I&APs and the project team. The 140 hectares of
conservation area included the south-western part of the property. Access to the village was
restricted at the West Coast Road and the final plan included 1267 units as opposed to the
1595 originally planned (Executive Summary, EIA for the Melkbosstrand Golf Village
Development, 1997).2
This EIA underscores the valuable scoping phase which informed the terms of reference for
the specialist studies. The public participation process emphasized the traffic and visual
impacts of this development. The EIA provided I&APs a legitimate forum to express their
concerns and suggestions. The EIA also assisted the planners to identify the most valuable
vegetation to include in the conservation area. The EIA reduced the number of units from
the maximum allowed under the zoning and attempted to make the development as visually
unobtrusive as possible. The EIA also brought out other important issues like the safety and
evacuation emergency system that needs to be in place since the village falls under the 16
kilometer radius of the Koeberg Nuclear Power plant. The EIA further recommended the
close monitoring of the irrigation run-off and its effects on the indigenous vegetation and
the groundwater.
3 Verified through interviews with Robin Twentyman-Jones, February 1998.
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The length of the EIA, approximately 6 months including the informal meeting held with
key I&APs in December 1996, did not inconvenience the development nor did it make the
project unfeasible. The positive results produced by the EIA played a significant role in
ensuring that the development minimized environmental impacts.
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Case 2: Saldanha Steel Project
This case examines the EIA for the siting of a steel mill in an environmentally sensitive
coastal area. This was a contentious project and EIA which resulted in a final decision that
angered many environmentalists. The fact that alternative sites were not considered because
the terms of reference were so narrowly written posed a huge challenge to practitioners. An
independent environmental audit highlights some changes in the plans despite the most
major area of non-compliance with the condition of approval -- refusal to locate the mill at
the required distance from the bay.
Saldanha Steel is a small West Coast Town situated approximately 120km north of Cape
Town. The towns of Vredenburg and Langebaan are situated in close proximity to the north
and south of Saldanha respectively. Saldanha was traditionally a fishing center while
Vredenburg was an agricultural service center. Langebaan, in contrast, is a popular
retirement and holiday/tourist destination (Stuart and Wiseman, 1997).
In 1985 the natural features of Saldanha Bay and Langebaan Lagoon were recognized
through the proclamation of the West Coast National Park. The lagoon, bay and islands
host over 50% of the world's population of a sub-species of Swift Tern, over 100,000
breeding pairs of seabirds as well as a habitat for African Penguins. As a result, the
Langebaan Lagoon has been recognized under the Ramsar Convention as a wetland of
international importance (Stuart and Wiseman, 1997).
The first heavy industry to be established in the Vredenburg-Saldanha area following the
construction of the iron-ore export harbour was the Namakwa Sands Plant in 1993. With
the approval of the Saldanha Steel Project in 1995, a number of downstream industries have
been attracted to the area resulting in substantial growth in the region (Stuart and Wiseman,
1997).
To date, seven major ETAs have been undertaken in the Saldanha area. They are EIAs for
Namakwa Sands, Saldanha Steel Project, Portnet's General Cargo Quay, Pretoria Portland
Cement Corex Slag Mill, Alpha Cement Factory, Strategic Fuel Fund and Durferco Steel Mill
(Stuart and Wiseman, 1997).
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The Saldanha Steel Project (SSP) was launched as a definitive proposal in October 1991 by
four companies: the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd. (IDC), the
Iron and Steel Corporation Ltd. (Iscor), Hoogovens Technical Services Iron and Steel BV of
the Netherlands, and the Voest-Alpine Industrieanlagenbau Gmb of Austria. The aim of the
SSP was to build a mini-steel mill in South Africa (Jardine et al, 1997).
Location of the Steel Mill
Phase 1 of the EIA was used to select a site for the steel mill in 1993. This evaluation was
based purely on an economic feasibility study of a steel plant placed at each of the five
different locations within South Africa: Richards Bay, Newcastle, Port Elizabeth, Sishen and
Saldanha. This evaluation determined that Saldanha Bay was the most economically viable
location for the steel mill and that the cost factor outweighed any positive attributes of other
locations in the South Africa (Jardine et al, 1997).
Jardine et al argue that "If the IEM procedure had been applied in this case, the proponent
would have considered economic factors as part of a broader environmental evaluation.
When an assessment of alternative sites is based on a range of decision factors, as required
by IEM, a number of feasible sites tend to emerge" (Jardine et al, 1997, p14 0).
If the IEM procedures had been applied to the alternative sites, the delays that subsequently
arose with the early choice of a single site might have been avoided.
Once the Yzervarkensrug site had been selected as the preferred site for the steel mill, a
preliminary environmental assessment was conducted by the Malgas Environmental
Consortium. The Consortium found that significant impacts could occur and recommended
that a full EIA of the proposed steel mill be undertaken. In March 1994, the SSP
commissioned Environmental Services, of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
(CSIR) to undertake a full EIA of the proposed steel mill at Yzervarkensrug.
According to the IEM guideline documents, an EIA is "intended to provide the authorities
with enough information on the positive and negative aspects of the proposal, and feasible
alternatives, with which to make a decision" (Department of Environment Affairs, 1992).
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In the case of SSP, the EIA was restricted to the selected site and no alternative sites were
selected.
During this EIA process an intense public debate grew over the positive and negative
aspects of the proposed steel mill. In response to the controversy, the Minister of
Environmental Affairs and Tourism invoked, for the first time, section 15 of the
Environmental Conservation Act 73 of 1989. This section empowers the Minister to
appoint a Board of Investigation to assist him in the evaluation of any matter or any appeal.
On 7 June 1995, the Board of Investigation was appointed composed of Chairperson Justice
J.H. Steyn and two expert assessors, R.F. Fuggle and R. Maruma.
The Board of Investigation was appointed because of considerable resistance against the
proposal, especially with respect to the proximity of the steel mill to the Langebaan Lagoon
which forms part of the West Coast National Park and which is registered as a wedand of
international importance in terms of the Ramsar Convention. Another significant
motivation for the appointment came from the reservations expressed by the Provincial
Department of Environmental Affairs regarding the steel mill (ardine et al, 1997).
The Board of Investigation held public hearings from 18 July to 29 August 1995 where they
heard 56 witnesses who presented oral evidence in addition to the 104 written submissions
they received (totaling around 3,000 pages).
The Board of Investigation found that the 1994 regional structure plan had not given
adequate attention to environmental matters. The Board concluded that the spatial layout of
the structure plan did not optimize for a range of land uses, most notably for mariculture,
tourism and industrial development. The Board found that the plan inadequately dealt with
the proximity of the Ramsar site and the existing mariculture industry. The Board felt
strongly that the structure plan be revisited and the possibility of heavy industry developing
close to the shoreline, in areas that would be detrimental to the tourism and mariculture
industries, be reconsidered. Apparently, the local authorities has not considered mariculture
because, as a water use, they interpreted this use as beyond the scope of the Land Use
Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985 (Jardine et al, 1997).
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The Board of Investigation was concerned about the lack of alternative sites and considered
this a shortcoming of the EIA. Under the circumstances, the Board felt that the developer
was "unreasonable" in not considering other sites in the vicinity of the preferred site. The
Board thus saw it within its mandate to address this issue and undertook and assessment of
the suitability of alternative sites.
To expedite this process, the Board appointed a financial sub-committee to investigate the
economic viability of the three sites in the Saldanha area. The sites were: Yzervarkensrug,
the subject of the site-specific EIA, and two other alternative sites which had been
considered during Phase 1 and rejected on the basis of cost considerations. The two sites
are Langeberg, 9km from sea, and Schouwtoneel, 13.4km from sea (ardine et al, 1997).
The primary finding of the Board was that the Yzervarkensrug site was not desirable for
environmental and aesthetic reasons, and that a suitable site further inland, Langeberg, was
preferred. The Langeberg site, according to the financial sub-committee, would not
significantly jeopardize the economic viability of the development. The relocation would
cost the equivalent of 1% of shareholders' returns while the risk of impacts, especially
cumulative ones, would be reduced. The disadvantages of the Langeberg site could be
overcome without undue cost and difficulty.
The Board advised that a move to this site was required in the public interest in order to
ensure optimal reconciliation of development and environmental interests in the Saldanha
area. As far as the Board was concerned, this was a 'win-win' situation that would
accommodate the interests of Saldanha Steel, tourism, mariculture and other industries in the
area.
Justice Steyn, Chair of the Commission, stated that the Langeberg site would be "tolerably
robust based on average international prices and would offer acceptable and satisfactory
returns to shareholders." He added, "Because we consider the wetland and the estuary as
precious legacies to be preserved for future generations we were cautious in the extreme in
evaluating possible risks to their integrity." (Sapa, 6 October 1995).
The Board of Investigation conducted its investigation over a period of 4 months. On 27
September 1995, six days before the Board of Investigation Report was submitted to the
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Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Iscor and IDC (two of the four partners in
this venture) announced that they would not be proceeding with the SSP in its current form.
They reasoned that the delays in obtaining approval were causing an escalation in projected
capital cost and a decrease in forecasted project returns from SSP.
The Western Cape Government did not want to lose this development and immediately
called meetings with Saldanha Steel, the IDC, and a range of environmental organizations
and experts with the aim of finding a compromise site. The Minister stated that a
compromise site was necessary because a move from Yzervarkensrug to the Langeberg site
would require further environmental assessments resulting in more delays that were
unacceptable to SSP. The compromise negotiated involved moving the steel mill from its
original position, on the Yzervarkensrug property, 2 km from the bay, to a new position in
the north-east corner of the same property, 4 km from the bay.
At the beginning of November 1995, a Ramsar delegation was dispatched to South Africa at
the request of the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. The Ramsar
delegation was in agreement with the Board of Investigation's recommendation of moving
the mill to Langeberg. However, they felt that if all other recommendations of the Board,
and further conditions stipulated by the provincial government were adhered to, then a
move to the compromise site 4 km away would not significantly increase the threat to the
character of the Ramsar site of Langebaan Lagoon (Jardine et al, 1997).
On the 8th of November, following the Ramsar delegation's visit, the Western Cape
Provincial Minister of Agriculture, Planning and Tourism announced that the Western Cape
cabinet had conditionally approved the rezoning of Yzervarkensrug for the purpose of siting
a steel mill. This announcement came twelve months after the EIA was finalized and came
in the form of a press release. To date, the Record of Decision has not been publicly seen.
The 8 November 1995 press release by Mr. Lampie Fick, Minister of Agriculture, Planning
and Tourism stated: "After intensive consideration it became evident that the identification,
evaluation and further impact assessment of the development on an alternative site as
recommended by the Steyn Commission would have inevitably resulted in further delays and
increased costs and that the project would have been lost to the RSA [Republic of South
Africa] in its entirety."
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In his submission to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Environmental Affairs and
Tourism's hearing on Industrial Developments in the Saldanha Area on 4 November 1996,
A. M. van Huyssteen (attorney and former member of the State Attorney's Office)
expressed, "However, on 8 November 1995 the Yzervarkensrug site was nevertheless
rezoned by the Provincial Cabinet. It would appear that effectively the Steyn
recommendations were "dismissed" without reading the underlying evidence, and that this
was done despite express cautioning not to do so."
Member of the Steyn Commission, Prof. Richard Fuggle, made his own submission and
stated that "despite all the studies and recommendations the balance of political and
economic power has been such that economic developments have been able to proceed with
scant attention to factors which they deemed to be of lesser importance than their own
interests."
In an insightful submission to the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, the Minerals and
Energy Policy Center state that one of the primary reasons for the delays and disasters
around EIAs and siting stem from poor land use planning. The Development Facilitation
Act states that, "Competent authorities at national, provincial and local government levels
should assume responsibility for co-ordination between various sectors involved in land
developments so as to minimize conflict over demands on scarce resources," and
"Competent authorities at national, provincial and local government levels should deal
sensitively and responsibly with the impact of land developments upon the environment."
The same submission states that the Saldanha Steel case demonstrates where "none of the
authorities appear to be willing to take responsibility for the sensitive decisions. Because of
this, the siting of the plant will most probably go effectively unchallenged. None of the
politicians, including the Local Transitional Council, the minister of Environment and
Tourism, the Premier or any other affected departments are prepared or quipped to
competently address the problems at hand. Unless the "competent authorities" demonstrate
a willingness to assume and act on the responsibility assigned to them in this Act, there will
be ongoing planning disasters."
Despite the many failures of the authorities to make a decision based on the EIA or the
recommendations of the Steyn Commission, the Saldanha Steel EIA identified, assessed and
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proposed mitigation/enhancement measures for a number of project/site specific impacts of
the development. This EIA also contributed to the design phase of the project thus
facilitating mitigation before the plant became operational. Some of these include:
- input into the design of the emission stacks (addition of air filters) and steel making
process to mitigate dusts and air pollution impacts.
* input into the design of the cooling system to reduce the amount of water consumed by
the plant for cooling.
- input into the aesthetic design of the Steel Plant complex (Stuart and Wiseman, 1997).
The EIA also included a commitment from Saldanha Steel to the recommendations
contained in the EIR which included a design of an Environmental Management Plan for
the Construction phase of the project. The management plan aided in the implementation
of the following mitigatory measures:
" Establishing part of a site as a conservation area
- Removing fauna such as lizards, tortoises and snakes from the site to the conservation area
before site clearance commenced.
- Stockpiling of topsoil for later use in the rehabilitation of open area with the site.
- Implementing a dust control plan to limit the impact of dust resulting from construction
activities.
- Adopting a policy of employing local people first.
- Setting up information and recruitment centers.
- Implementing a training program for local people to obtain the skills required to work in a
steel plant. (Stuart and Wiseman, 1997)
In October 1996, African Environmental Solutions conducted an Audit Report of the
Saldanha Steel Project to see if the project was in compliance with the relevant legislation,
the conditions as set by the provincial authority, and the undertakings given by Saldanha
steel in the Environmental Management Plan. African Environmental Solutions were
contracted by Saldanha Steel (Pty) Ltd. because the established Environmental Monitoring
Committee required an objective opinion. The audit scope was limited to checking the
compliance with those conditions and commitments spelled out for Phase 1 of the
construction phase.
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The audit team further chose to include the issue of plant relocation as indicated in the
Minister's press release. this condition was the only condition not included in the approval
letter of rezoning.
The audit found that of the 49 issues covered in the audit-33
- Six were not applicable to Saldanha Steel.
- Three were not relevant to the construction phase.
- Five were still being undertaken and regarded as work in progress. They were scheduled
but not due for action.
- Thirteen were works in progress for which scheduled actions were completed thus far but
the full condition could not be met at this time of the audit.
- Fifteen were in full compliance for which all necessary actions have been completed.
- Six were in partial compliance.
- One condition, plant relocation, was not in compliance.
This audit was conducted during the construction phase. It would be interesting to see what
an environmental audit would look like now that the plant is in operation at a location closer
to the bay than recommended by the EIA. Saldanha Steel was anxious to fast track things
and to get things done quickly. Had Saldanha Steel conducted their first EIA based on the
IEM, they could have streamlined the decision-making process and possibly prevented the
delays that lead to Iscor's withdrawal. The EIA would have had a broader terms of
reference -- including a requirement to evaluate alternative sites. This is a case where a
mandatory EIA could have produced a different outcome in terms of the recommendations
of the site location and associated environmental impacts.
The Saldanha Steel Project had strong development interests with serious financial
considerations for the province. Saldanha Steel is a multi-million rand investment and
promised new jobs in the area. The Western Cape Province is the only province where the
National Party (NP, the party of the old apartheid regime) held more votes than any other
political party. The NP Premier of the Province was keen to fast track this development
because the investment and jobs was coming into a NP province and this project would be
one of the first Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP, the new government's
official plan to move the country forward) projects in the country. Politically, the NP
33 Facts and figures compiled from the Saldanha Steel Audit Report, October 1996.
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wanted to embarrass the African National Congress, (ANC, the majority party nationally) by
being the first to implement an RDP project (the RDP was endorsed by all political parties
that made up the Government of National Unity but the ANC and other anti-apartheid, pro-
democratic organizations were the authors of this document).
Without the public and media pressure, the province would have given Saldanha Steel the go
ahead to build the plant without an EIA. Saldanha Steel did build the plant on the location
they intended to build in the first place and chose to ignore the condition of approval that
required a 2 kilometer move. Despite this, the EIA changed Saldanha Steel's materials
handling storage to reduce dust levels and more significantly, reduced water consumption
with the option of using sea water for further expansion. The issue of dust levels was first
brought up in a public hearing which resulted in design changes.M
This EIA played a significant role in informing local communities and NGOs about the EIA
process and thus provided ad-hoc training for participation in future EIAs. Now that the
Saldanha Steel Project is operating, more industry will be attracted to the area and local
communities and NGOs will be asked to partake in the public participation process.
The final decision in the Saldanha Steel Project was motivated purely by political and
economic factors. The terms of reference were narrowly written to exclude alternative sites
for the steel mill. And, the Premier of the province had already decided to go ahead with
Saldanha Steel prior to an EIA. However, the three main lessons to learn from this case are
that an EIA cannot be conducted without examining feasible alternatives; when an
independent Board of Appeals is appointed, they must be given some "teeth" to enforce
their recommendations; and finally, the competent authority must implement and monitor
the conditions of approval.
3 Interview with Keith Wiseman, February 1998.
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Case 3: Strategic Fuel Fund
This case examines the impacts of maximizing an under-utilized state asset. During South
Africa's isolation during the apartheid years, Strategic Fuel Fund's (SFF's) primary function
was to procure, store and supply crude oil to the domestic refining industry. Now, with the
lifting of sanctions, SFF's role is not so crucial. However, SFF's current business still relates
to the maintenance of South Africa's strategic physical reserves of crude oil. The
government wanted to identify the environmental impacts of increasing the oil tanker traffic
so that it can store and trade more than the current amount required by the state. The
decision on the this EIA was only made public in April 1998. It is evident that the final
decision was based on the outcomes of the EIA.
Strategic Fuel Fund's (SFF's) storage installation at Saldanha is the largest facility of its kind
in the world. It comprises of the six in-ground concrete storage tanks which have a
combined capacity of 45 million barrels of oil. The tanks are linked by pipeline to an oil
terminal at the Port of Saldanha where tankers either discharge or backload oil. A second
107 km long pipeline links the oil storage facilities with the Caltex refinery at Milnerton and
conveys most of the refinery's crude oil requirements. Although Caltex imports crude oil
independently of SFF's operations, the refinery is currently dependent on access to Saldanha
oil terminal and to SFF's oil storage infrastructure for most of its oil supply (currently about
80 percent, in future, probably 100 percent of the refinery's oil supply) (CSIR, Draft EIA
Report, 1997).
The Strategic Fuel Fund Association has been under intense negotiations with Iran
concerning the potential storage of oil at Saldanha Bay, South Africa. In order to go ahead
with any operations should a deal with Iran materialize, SFF will have to conduct an EIA of
the changes to oil transfer and storage operations. The principle purpose of the EIA was to
ensure that an informed decision be made on which of the alternatives to pursue. The EIA
is would also show any possible impacts on the nearby West Coast National Park, which
included Langebaan Lagoon, a listed Wetland of International Importance in terms of the
Ramsar Convention.
The oil storage capacity and strategic reserves held in South Africa currently exceed the
country's minimum requirements. Current policy allows SFF to trade an oil turnover
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equivalent to 15% of the strategic reserve. Trading profits are adequate to meet SFF's
operating costs but do not offset the interest payable on the value of oil held in storage. SFF
proposes a joint venture of oil storage and trading agreement with an oil-producing country
like Iran to reduce the economic impact of the SFF. The target volume of oil that will be
held in stock by SFF will match the refining needs for approximately 90 days of petrol
consumption in South Africa (CSIR, Draft EIA Report, 1997).
The EIA regulations were not in place when SFF presented their project proposal; i.e. there
was no regulatory requirement for the organization to conduct the EIA. However, in
response to media and public pressure the Ministers of the then Department of Mineral &
Energy Affairs and Environmental Affairs and Tourism voluntarily committed their state-
owned organization (SFF) to the ETA. They further undertook to allow SFF to proceed
with the project only if it did not present an unacceptably high environmental risk -- based
on the outcome of the EIA.35
Project Alternatives Considered in the EIA
1) Maintenance of the status quo of SFF's operations
2) Expansion of tanker traffic and optimization of the port design using the existing single
mooring berth for tankers.
3) Expansion of tanker traffic and optimization of the port design with the provision of a
double berth mooring for tankers.
4) Expansion of tanker traffic and oil transfer operations with the replacement of the
Saldanha oil terminal facilities with an offshore Single Point Mooring.
5) Closure of the oil terminal and SFF's storage installation at Saldanha Bay.
When it came to SFF, in some ways it was much more controversial than the Saldanha Steel
Project. This was so because of the Exxon Valdez and the Sea Empress oil spills. However,
the EIA process was not as contentious as the Saldanha Steel case. The principle reason for
this is that the proponent ensured a good process for conducting the ETA from the
beginning.
The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research was asked to conduct the EIA for the
SFF. They immediately tried to find out who was going to make the final decision on this
35 E-mail correspondence with Michael Burns, 20 April 1998.
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project. They wanted to avoid another Steyn Commission scenario. In other words, they
were keen to avoid the mistakes made at the Saldanha Steel Project.
The Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism at central goverament was
contacted because of the Ramsar wetland. CSIR received a letter saying that those powers
are clearly delegated to the province. When the provincial government was approached, they
said that they were not taking responsibility for this project because it was definitely a central
government issue. The CSIR then sought legal opinion which determined that nobody was
in charge of this decision. The client was in charge of this decision. SFF had decided that
they did not want the responsibility of making this decision either.3
According to Michael Burns who worked on the EIA, SFF was quite innovative in their
strategy. SFF did not want the decision to be purely political or inefficient one. They
identified a Review Panel Coordinator who would appoint an independent panel. They
contacted Andrew Brown, an eminent, well-respected advocate with an environmental
interest.
Brown invited nominations from I&APs for the review panel. He used his discretion to pick
people. He shortlisted about 20 people and circulated this list to key I&APs. He ended up
with 6 people with a variety of skills and the coordinator. Their role was to review the EIA
and the process, all the specialist studies and check the integrity of the EIA and process.
Because they did not have any statutory authority, they could not make a project decision --
they made a project recommendation.
CSIR got SFF to commit themselves to abide by the recommendations of the review panel.
This way they were contractually and thus legally bound to the recommendations and the
conditions under which they can proceed. The client, SFF, was very happy with this
process rather than the politicians interfering with the decision -- especially after the
Saldanha Steel and Richards Bay EIAs.
This is an important project to SFF and they were prepared to abide by the
recommendations of the panel. They were very worried that the project could flounder on
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Interview with Michael Burns, 1998.
poor and inefficient decision-making. They saw what happened at Saldanha Steel and knew
of the financial implications of holding a project back. They wanted to do the right thing.37
Once the panel is happy with the process, the science, the rationale, and the conclusion, they
make a recommendation to SFF. Under the contractual agreement, SFF is bound to accept
the recommendations of the review panel. However, there is an appeals clause to the
agreement which SFF can trigger if they feel unhappy about the decision or parts of the
decision. After the recommendation was made by the panel, SFF appealed some of the
recommendations.-
How did the EIA affect the decision?
Often, when a project proponent comes along one basically accepts the benefits they claim
will materialize from the project in terms of foreign exchange, jobs etc. In fact, the main
focus of the EIA found that the economic benefits of the project were about 2 orders of
magnitude lower than what was predicted by the proponent. They were extremely pleased
that the CSIR had actually unearthed this.
The EIA had a major impact on the nature of the project. The EIA forced the proponent to
rethink the project based on this new information. The income from the project would not
allow them to spend all the money on the off-shore buoy for example. So, SFF was now
constrained by their own economics too.
There has been a decision on SFF, the details of which are described in a comprehensive
Review Panel report. In essence, the panel presents the binding recommendation that SFF
may proceed with only very limited levels of crude oil trading (for about a 5 year period,
after which the situation must be reviewed) levels which are only slightly higher than at
present. The volume of permitted trade is a fraction of the levels first anticipated by SFF.39
The SFF case highlights the benefits of an EIA with a broad outlook. The economic
analysis from the EIA immediately eliminated the more expensive options available to SFF.
This case also highlights the value of a process with which all the interested and affected
37Interview with Michael Burns, 1998.
- Interview with Michael Burns, 1998. At the time of the interview, the final project decision had not been
made.
39E-mail correspondence with Michael Burns, 20 April 1998.
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parties are satisfied. The SFF process was much better than the one employed by Saldanha
Steel because all feasible alternatives were identified and considered. Another factor to
consider is that the provincial authority did not have a strong political or economic interest
in this project. Furthermore, SFF agreed from the outset to follow the recommendations of
the EIA and they hired Brown to convene an independent review panel. The review panel
in this case knew that they had a legally enforceable contract with SFF (with an appeals
clause for SFF) unlike at Saldanha Steel.
In a country that lacks the governmental capacity to review EIAs, this review panel model
(with "teeth" to enforce) is one that can streamline the entire process for all involved. This,
in turn, also provides a level of independence from the economic and political interests of
government institutions. The innovative use of the independent review panel is a model for
future practice in South Africa.
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Analysis of cases
The three cases are all very different in their process and outcomes. Yet, each one shows
how the EIA changed project plans. Despite their differences, it is important to note the
following elements that may explain why EIAs made a difference:
* The EIA provides an opportunity for alternative proposals (other than those from the
proponent and EIA preparer) to be considered. In the Saldanha Steel case, NGOs
conducted their own specialist studies and made critical input at almost stages of the EIA.
The EIA legitimized the input and alternatives.
* The EIA provides people (public/media/NGOs) with a legitimate forum to bring in other
standards into the EIA. EIA laws do not have any written standards in them but an ETA
allows parties to bring in other laws that have set standards for emissions, land-uses, water
uses etc. Even in cases where the government may not be actively monitoring standards, the
EIA allows concerned individuals and organizations to bring those standards in to evaluate
the project. Use of good standards can usually affect project plans in positive ways.
- The EIA introduces a new player, the EIA preparer, into the whole process. The EIA
preparer holds independent interests and has a reputation to uphold. They bring their
professional norms and can convince the proponent to change project plans. Crowther,
Campbell and Associates were able to convince Johnnic Properties to make significant
changes to their project and construction plans. This group brings an unique experience
based on other cases to every EIA.
- The EIA raises questions about mitigation before it is too late. Concerned parties can get
the proponent to agree to certain mitigation measures before plans are in place. This
important step avoids future conflict between parties and ensures, at least on paper, a
working relationship between the proponent and concerned parties. A proponent's
willingness to address mitigation can also be indicative of the proponent's commitment to
addressing concerns.
- The EIA process begins to develop a capacity and expertise among civil society over time.
This expertise among NGOs can bring pressure to bear for higher and improved standards.
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If an EIA reveals that no standards for dust levels exist, concerned parties can use this
information to pressure for better standards.
- EIAs are precedent setting. The importance of an EIA well done in the past sets a
standard for others. If it is a bad case, practitioners tend to avoid it and improve on it.
EIAs thus set their own norms. For example, many practitioners will avoid the way
Saldanha Steel carried out their EIA because of the narrow terms of reference and failure to
consider alternative sites. On the other hand, the public participation process of the St.
Lucia Dune Mining case is one that practitioners want to use but improve on. Similarly, the
independent review panel model used in the Strategic Fuel Fund case is one that some
practitioners are advocating.
The three case studies give us a glimpse into the details of EIAs in South Africa and how
project plans changed. South Africa is by no means an exception to the international
experience with EIAs. These cases shed light on the value of the various phases of an EIA
and make a strong case for the use of mandatory EIAs.
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IV. Lessons Learned and Recommendations
The past fifteen years of conducting EIAs provide a foundation on which South Africa can
build. The new law and regulations do not depart from the recommended voluntary practice
that was in effect in the 1990s; in fact, South Africa's experience with EIAs in the 1970s and
1980s formed the basis of the IEM guidelines and procedures as first drafted in 1989. The
experience using the IEM led to its redrafting in 1992 (and it is now undergoing another
redrafting phase). The current law and regulations rely heavily on the use of IEM even
though the latest draft regulations do not mention IEM by name. Many practitioners have
submitted suggestions that include the incorporation of IEM procedures in the final draft.
Some of the major lessons learned from the past center around the process of conducting
EIAs, the role of public participation, the need to ensure a good scoping step, the use of
review panels and the importance of land use planning in environmental decision-making.
This chapter will highlight each of the lessons learned, provide a critique of the current
system and conclude with recommendations for future EIA practice in South Africa.
Critique of the EIA Process
EIAs and all accompanying steps must be accessible to interested and affected parties. In the
1980 and even early 1990s, emphasis was mainly placed on the final document. This is no
longer the case. Indeed the pendulum may have swung too far in the direction of process,
but equilibrium seems to be within reach. There is growing sentiment that a sound process
for conducting EIAs with transparent goals and strong elements of public participation,
scoping and decision-making is more likely to lead to better environmental protection and
development decisions. Each of these process elements is discussed in greater detail below.
One major weakness of EIAs is the lack of context in the final report. The decision maker
or members of the public need to know the context in which the project is proposed. Will
this project be the first or one of many to contribute negatively to the environment? Is the
project an anchor development that will attract other developments? Johnston argues that
this lack of a theoretical framework makes it hard to evaluate the data:
"The result is that many EISs avoid explaining what the real issues of
a project are and what relationship a project may have to the
environment, economy, and community. Many impact statements
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also give no hint of the political battles raging over certain impacts,
nor of the scientific arguments concerning data interpretation"
(Corwin et al, 1975, p114).
Clearly stating the assumptions used to find common ground on the political, economic and
scientific differences provides more information on the context. 0
Public Participatione'
The value of involving the public (interested and affected parties) in project planning and
scoping the EIA has been proven in a country where public participation is now a central
tenet. The EIAs that involved the public at an early stage were more likely to produce an
EIR (Environmental Impact Report) in a timely manner and the project was more likely to
move forward. The main reason is that the interested and affected parties' (I&APs is the
equivalent of stakeholders in the United States) concerns and inputs were introduced earlier
and their contributions shaped the final outcome.
Hyman and Stiftel make a strong case for how best to use public participation in EIA:
"There are two rationales for public participation: efficiency and
legitimacy. The efficiency rationale suggests that participation will
result in better-designed government services and a greater ability to
gain the support of diverse groups in fulfilling policies after their
adoption. The legitimacy rationale sees participation as a way to
increase people's confidence in officials and make government more
stable and accountable. Government administrators usually accept
efficiency more readily than legitimacy as a rationale. When care is
taken to ensure the representation of all concerned groups through
an extensive media and outreach campaign, public participation can
broaden the range of values considered in an environmental
assessment" (Hyman and Stiftel, 1988, p45-46).
4 For a detailed discussion on the types of non-objective decisions that go into an EIA and the importance of
stating the assumptions within the report see L. Susskind and L. Dunlap, "The Importance of Non-Objective
Judgments in Environmental Impact Assessment", Environmental ImpactAssessment Review, Volume 2, No. 4,
1981.
41 For a detailed analysis see Fowkes, S and Gowdie, S., A Preliminary Assessment of the Current Practice of
Interested and Affected Party Involvement in environmental Decision Making in South Africa since the
Introduction of Integrated Environmental Management (IEM), Department of Environmental and
Geographical Science, University of Cape Town, August 1995.
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As South Africa struggles to find a balance for public participation in decision-making, I
would argue that the country is moving from the efficiency rationale to the legitimacy one.
A good public participation model allows for the dissemination of information to a
community that otherwise would not see it. Disclosure of information encourages public
participation. However, there are relatively low levels of participation in South Africa,
especially in semi-literate communities. 42
If done properly, public participation can give direction and focus to an EIA -- especially
during the scoping phase. In many cases the public input sets the agenda for the EIA and
helps focus the EIA strategic issues. Local knowledge plays a critical role and assists the
specialists in identifying specific local attributes.43 Local knowledge can thus save research
time and provide valuable information about the uniqueness of a place. Public participation
is also crucial to the consideration of alternative site. Comments on the draft and the
specialist reports have often influenced the recommendations made in the final EIA.44 In
the Alusaf Hillside smelter case, the public participation process ensured that an atmospheric
assessment and a study of respiratory health of children were included in the EIA. The
process forced an inter-disciplinary approach rather than a focusing the EIA purely on the
science. 45
Public participation processes can be both enlightening and confusing. In predominantly
wealthy communities (those made up of professionals and with resources at their disposal),
the levels of public engagement are relatively high. These communities can afford to hire
experienced lawyers, engineers, and planners to fight their case for them. In these situations,
the public participation process enlightens. While the levels of public participation may be
just as high or higher in poorer and semi-literate communities, no attempt is made to make
the information accessible. Silence in these meetings is too often interpreted as consent and
agreement with the proposal. The technical reports are too bulky and intimidating to
communities who are asked to participate with no resources and few skills for interpreting
the information at hand. 6
42 Interview with Richard Fuggle, 1998.
43 Interview with David Shandler, 1998.
44 Interview with Chris Dalgliesh, 1998.
45 Interview with Alex Weaver, 1998.
4 Interview with Tony Barbour, 1998.
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Heather McKay from the Department of Water Affairs is quick to point out that there is a
strong difference between consultation and participation. The public may be consulted on a
decision yet not participate in the actual decision-making. This is often a point of contention
because the public feels they should be part of the decision-making process.47 Unless
members of the public are part of a review panel, McKay is correct to say that the public is
consulted -- but not included -- in the decision-making. The current guidelines and
regulations allow for multiple consultations with the public. The public is viewed as part of
the larger planning/consulting team with the final decision still in the hands of the
competent authority.
If the public is consulted, then why does one rarely find decision makers at the public
participation meetings? Richard Fuggle, an academic and practitioner in the field finds this
to be one of the major weaknesses of the current system. 8 Decision makers need to hear
the concerns of the public directly. One way to remedy this problem is to require the
decision makers to convene and facilitate the public participation meetings themselves. The
current system expects an independent consultant to facilitate the process.
There is little doubt that public participation can make important contributions to the EIA.
At the very least, the process allows the public access to information about what is going on
in their own communities.
Scoping and Alternatives
The lessons learned from the Saldanha Steel Project EIA was that good scoping is essential.
There needs to be time for the scoping notices to get out and to get all the interested and
affected parties involved.49 The scoping stage is a crucial step in the EIA because it explores
the parameters of the study and defines the key questions to be answered. A recent and
somewhat common problem is that developers are writing the terms of reference so
narrowly as to make it impossible to stop a project through the EIA.5 In fact, the terms of
reference are written so that very few alternatives are considered and only a limited number
of changes can be made to the project plans. Developers view the EIA as another hurdle to
47 Interview with Heather McKay, 1998.
4 interview with Richard Fuggle, 1998.
49 Interview with Keith Wiseman, 1998.
5 Interview with Heather McKay, 1998.
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jump through and deliberately write the terms of reference in a way to exclude other studies
that may be relevant to the EIA.
A stronger commitment is needed toward exploring alternatives (including the rare "no-
build" option) in cases where alternatives exist. The limited number of alternatives currently
examined is quite frustrating. The IEM process is weak on site, technology, use, and design
alternatives. Such alternatives are rarely examined and when they are, they are considered
only superficially. The 'no-build' option is rarely studied seriously.51
Examining many alternatives can often be a time-consuming and wasteful exercise if the
proponent has already decided on the type of development. There needs to be an emphasis
on the feasible alternatives and in cases where a certain plan may go forward, it may be more
effective to study the mitigation measures for the most feasible plan.
Institutional Capacity Building
South Africa does not have the institutional capacity to review EIAs and make decisions
based on the information provided by them. A few EIAs that have used review panels and
outside experts to make recommendations to the competent authority offer a model for
more effective decision-making in the absence of institutional capacity. The Strategic Fuel
Fund's review panel is a good example; however, one needs to ensure the impartiality and
legitimacy of such a review panel for their recommendations to be taken seriously.2
Land Use Planning
Land use planning and environmental evaluations are not coordinated in any way. There
needs to be better land use planning in order for EIAs and Integrated Environmental
Management to be successful. Spot zoning on the local level along with a failure to defend
previous zoning ordinances allows major developments to be considered almost anywhere.
If the Saldanha Bay area had a comprehensive land-use plan that recognized the need to
avoid heavy industrial development along the sensitive coast line, the steel mill decision
could have been an easy and inexpensive one. Unfortunately, because of poor land use
planning, many developments have to undertake EIAs when clear land-use objectives can
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51 Interview with Chris Dalgliesh, 1998.
5 Interview with Michael Burns, 1998.
indicate recommended usage in an area -- and in cases where proposed projects conflict with
the land-use objectives, avoid an EIA.
As Tony Barbour, a practitioner and activist, states, "There is no thorough assessment of
'appropriate' land-use or development. If the appropriateness of the development is
questionable, it should come out in an EIA".53
The Land Use Planning Ordinance (LUPO) grants decision-making power around land-use
planning to local authorities with an appeals structure to the premier of the province. It is
highly recommended to have an independent appeals process rather than to rely on the
politicians for this decision.54 Sometimes the authorities have an economic or political
interest in a development project and the very same authorities are responsible for the land-
use appeals. Because of the apparent conflict of interest it makes sense to experiment with
an independent appeals board. A lot of work needs to be done to dovetail LUPO and
Section 21 (the new EIA law) of the Environmental Conservation Act of 1989. One of
main obstacles to this happening is the lack of coordination among the different
departmental powers involved. The Ministries of Environment and Land need to coordinate
their efforts to ensure land-use designations that are also environmentally sensitive.
How can the IEM be improved?
Integrated Environmental Management (IEM) is a process that attempts to plan for a project
from its inception to final closure and dismantling. This is commonly referred to as "cradle
to grave" planning. According to Michael Burns at the Council for Scientific and Industrial
Research, "The cradle to grave concept is there but not practiced." 55 The environmental
impact assessment phase is one of three parts of the IEM process which includes an
environmental monitoring system for post-construction and during operation. The IEM
guidelines focus too much on the EIA stage and are thus weakest on the implementation
(Stage 3, see Figure 6) of the IEM procedure.5 The guidelines for post-EIA
monitoring/assessment need to be revised with a stronger emphasis on implementation and
how to achieve it.
53 Interview with Tony Barbour, 1998.
4 Interview with Steven Granger and Peter Tomalin, 1998.
55 Interview with Michael Burns, 1998.
' Interview with Alex Weaver, 1998.
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The major problem with IEM is its failure to monitor post-construction impacts and to
implement conditions of approval. The Conditions of Approval do not state that the
consultants who worked through the EIA be retained to help with follow-up. Experts need
to be on site to monitor and avoid, if possible, the negative impacts of construction (like the
Table Mountain Cable Car monitoring) (Barbour interview).
A budget requirement is necessary, to allow for an independent consultant (preferably the
one who conducted the EIA) to return and help audit the development. The audit would
assess the current impacts and compare it to those predicted by the EIA. The audit would
also assess the post-construction environmental management system and the budget
allocation to ensure the success of this management system.5
There is no clear attempt at understanding the carrying capacity of the environment. With
this understanding one can, for example, study the capacity of the water sources in an area
and the consumption patterns to determine levels of future development. "We do not have
the techniques to assess sustainability and so we push our resources to breaking point -- as
we see with water and waste in South Africa."58 EIAs focus on impact minimization rather
than source and sink capacities. EIAs dedicate considerable time and money on how best to
reduce the impacts, rarely stepping back and examining the appropriateness of the project
(this does require the existence of good base line studies).
Siva Chetty, an activist and practitioner, argues that:
"Communities now have leverage before saying 'yes' to an EIA since
the public participation element is emphasized in the new legislation.
The community needs to identify its needs before the process begins.
The EIAs take us to a new level by helping us cross the threshold
from previous gross inconsideration of the environment and ruthless
development to restore some dignity in the developmental
considerations." 59
The IEM procedure should include ways to support public participation through resources
and technical assistance. The process needs to empower and encourage NGOs to
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5 Interview with Heather Mckay, 1998.
58 Interview with Alex Weaver, 1998.
59 Interview with Siva Chetty, 1998.
participate.6 The public participation process integrates various disciplines and helps focus
the EIA. IEM in South Africa learned from other countries' experiences and it was
introduced when the country was riding on change and was receptive and ripe.61
The weakness of the IEM process is that there is no political will or capacity to implement
decisions based on EIAs. The IEM is weak at the decision-making stage and there are very
few guidelines for decision makers.6
The new law and regulations
While the EIA draft regulations and law were still new when I conducted my interviews,
most of the respondents shared their preliminary assessments with me. Since these are draft
regulations under comment, the final version to be released towards the end of the year
should look significantly different. The main concerns about the current regulations are:
- Constitutionally, the current regulations are totally confusing in terms of environmental
jurisdiction. The constitution calls for joint responsibility between the national and
provincial governments for the environment. Yet the regulations state that local authorities
are the ones who are responsible for a clean environment.63
- The new regulations do not mention the IEM in name. The White Paper on Environment
commits the Department of Environment and Tourism to the IEM guidelines. There
appears to be a disconnect between the IEM process and the regulations for conducting
EIAs. For example, the regulations do not allow for the public to comment on the Draft
ETA while the IEM does.
- The IEM provides for flexibility of methodology which allows practitioners to tailor the
EIA to a particular project. The new EIA regulations depart from this process by being very
prescriptive.
( Interview with Tony Barbour, 1998.
61 Interview with Alex Weaver, 1998.
6Interview with Keith Wiseman, 1998.
6 Interview with Richard Fuggle, 1998.
64Interview with Steven Granger and Peter Tomalin, 1998.
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- There is growing concern about the lack of monitoring and evaluation after final decisions
have been made. Often, the authority's conditions of approval are ignored with no
repercussions. Many cite the lack of political will to enforce the conditions of approval
along with the blatant under-capacity of the local, provincial and national authorities. The
Department of Environment Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) has a very weak position on the
national level because it has a very limited budget and staff to implement everything it is
required to do. After removing the money for the South African Weather Bureau and the
Antarctic Research Facilities from the total budget for DEAT, very little remains for all their
environmental responsibilities.65
- There is a strong push within the new regulations to incorporate an in-house
Environmental Management System that will continuously monitor environmental impacts
post-construction. While this commitment sometimes exists on paper, its successful
implementation is rarely heard of.
- The new regulations focus on detailed steps that need to be followed as part of the process.
The regulations are so detailed that practitioners are concerned they will be so busy checking
boxes that a small error in the EIA preparation can result in legal rejection if challenged by
opponents of the project.
Recommendations for future practice
Unlike many countries, South Africa has extensive experience with voluntary ELAs prior to
mandating them. The country already has a cadre of experienced practitioners along with a
legal framework that resembles past practice. Given this fortunate position, I feel that the
following recommendations can be central for EIAs to improve environmental protection
and development decisions.
- EIAs should ensure that all the interested and affected parties are convened by the decision
maker or review panel as early as possible during project planning and formulation.
- If significant impacts are determined, a letter of commitment to the outcomes of the EIA
should be signed by the proponent. This contractual agreement will have an appeals process
but legally binds the proponent to mitigation measures.
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65 Interview with Richard Fuggle, 1998.
- The competent authorities must set a reasonable and firm time limit for the EIA process
and communicate this to the proponent.
* Decision makers and/or their representatives must be present at all formal public meetings
discussing a proposal.
- Constitute an independent review panel to review the EIA and make recommendations to
the decision makers. These review panels need to be have "teeth" (with an appeals clause) to
implement and monitor the decisions.
* Involve potential users of the environmental assessment in the preparation of the scoping
document (Hyman and Stiftel, 1988,).
* The key assumptions of those preparing the EIA and specialist studies must be clearly
shown so that users will understand what was done. The findings should be disaggregated in
a way that allows regrouping of facts or reweighting of values. This allows decision makers
or users to conduct sensitivity analysis combining different sets of values with a given set of
facts to determine how the choice of values affects the conclusions of the analysis (Susskind
and Dunlap, 1981 and Hyman and Stiftel, 1988).
- Value judgments should be clearly identified. A well-documented assessment allows
decision makers to measure the sensitivity of the conclusions to alternative value judgments
(Hyman and Stiftel, 1988).
- Approval of the Terms of Reference should be written by the relevant agency to ensure
that an EIA report is relevant, acceptable and useful. In South Africa, many of the EIA's
Terms of Reference were written very narrowly by the proponent.
- ETAs must be used to inform other projects that directly relate to the proposed activity.
All effort must be made to use the information collated for any particular EIA to inform
other decisions in the area.
* Use the specialist studies from EIAs to compile base-line data for other proposals in the
area and let this information inform future land-uses.
Since ETAs are a key component of IEM, I propose the following general recommendations
for IEM procedures to ensure useful and informative EIAs. IEM procedures should:
- emphasize the iterative process of consultation
- emphasize the post-EIA phase and implementation
- provide resources and technical assistance for public participation
- display a multi-disciplinary character in the team composition
- have an underlying principle of problem-solving and conflict management
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- consider a review panel to make recommendations to the authority
- avoid a recipe/check list approach
- provide safeguards around conflict of interest (ensure independence of consultants and
review panels)
Conclusion
The literature on EIAs, regardless of the country of practice, points to three main reasons
for EIAs failing to meet their objectives. They are: the lack of professional capacity to
conduct EIAs; inadequate public involvement and; lack of institutional capacity and
obligation to adhere to the EIA findings. South Africa has inadvertently made significant
strides in dealing with these problems. Why was this the case in South Africa?
- Most countries do not have a cadre of people who know how to produce EIAs. Bringing
in foreign professionals to assist with EIAs and train local professionals is a costly venture
that most countries cannot afford. South Africa has a small group of professionals who
have considerable experience in this field. In many ways, South Africa is a microcosm of the
world -- it has a small group of predominantly white people living in conditions akin to
industrialized countries while the rest of the predominantly black population live in sub-
standard conditions. Institutional apartheid developed very strong scientific, technical and
professional skills among this elite group. Given the old regime's obsession with
conservation (as seen in the creation of huge game parks), institutions of higher learning
trained many professionals to conduct environmental evaluations of the fauna and flora.
However, there is a weakness in analyzing negative environmental impacts on social and
health conditions.
- The lack of public involvement in EIAs due to ineffective process or a general lack of
capacity to participate seriously limits the effectiveness of an EIA. Where did the capacity to
participate in EIAs come from? After decades of resistance to apartheid, the South African
public is very organized and responds easily and effectively to approaches that require public
participation. This ability to organize does not necessarily explain the capacity to participate
in EIAs. There has always been a set of NGOs concerned with environmental impacts. A
few of the trained white professionals were also anti-apartheid activists whose skills
complemented the tight-knit organizing on a community level. These professionals are
often called upon to provide information to and in some cases represent previously
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disenfranchised communities. A strong commitment to controlling a community's destiny
(given the years of repression) mobilizes individuals to participate in EIAs.
- Most government authorities have no sense of obligation or commitment to adhere to the
EIA process and its findings. This is true for the previous South African regime prior to
1990. However, I would argue that once South Africa was on the road to democratization,
government authorities were so closely watched and monitored by the local and international
public that this sense of obligation was reluctantly accepted in some governmental circles.
Because the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party campaigned on, and I feel
strongly believe in, government accountability, this sense of obligation to adhering to
findings with strong public participation will continue.
We have a good chance to use EIAs effectively in South Africa and we need to take
advantage of what we have learned over the years. In order to succeed EIAs must be
accessible and easy to read. We must ensure firm scoping guidelines that avoid the multi-
volume approach to EIAs. The EIA should also stick to a reasonable time line. We must
design a process in which we are continuously learning from the monitoring. This approach
is the best way to strengthen the process rather than the ten year review and revision. This
continuous learning process allows us to be more innovative with our approach. We must
further encourage an independent authority to train groups to participate effectively in EIAs.
This independent authority can also train national, provincial and local authorities in order to
build the institutional capacity. Joint trainings of the public, professionals and the
government may prove to be useful in helping develop a cohesive approach to ElAs that all
parties can agree on."
In addition, South Africa needs to develop stronger environmental standards to make EIAs
more effective. Without these standards, the most effective process can be useless for
environmental protection.
6 When I was at the Environmental Monitoring Group (Cape Town), I convened an information-sharing
workshop on EIAs in July 1997 in Cape Town. The workshop brought professionals, academics, activists,
NGOs, community groups, and government officials together to share their perceptions and ideas on EIAs. I
found that this informal setting helped different parties understand the perceptions and roles of the other
parties. For more on this workshop see "Environmental Impact Assessments and Public Participation; Report
on an EIA workshop convened by EMG" by Kalan and Ross, July 1997.
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The evolution of voluntary EIAs in South Africa provided the space to experiment with
environmental evaluations and management tools that formed the foundation for mandatory
EIAs. EIAs are not a new or foreign concept in South Africa. The experience of a few
companies engaged in this process, coupled with several high profile EIAs in the past five
years, have grabbed the attention of proponents, the public, NGOs and authorities alike.
This study provides evidence that voluntary EIAs in the past made some significant
contributions toward environmental protection and improving development decisions. By
showcasing three cases, not all success stories, I tried to show how EIAs played a role in
improving what may have been a bad idea to begin with.
If EIAs made a difference in these cases, then mandatory EIAs for special projects could
make a huge contribution towards protecting the environment and people's health. Let us
hope that South Africa will learn from its past and use EIAs effectively.
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